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Abstract
Four round Feistel permutation (like DES) is super-pseudorandom if each round function is
random or a secret universal hash function. A similar result is known for 5ve round MISTY
type permutation. It seems that each round function must be at least either random or secret in
both cases.
In this paper, however, we show that the second round permutation g in 5ve round MISTY
type permutation need not be cryptographic at all, i.e., no randomness nor secrecy is required.
g has only to satisfy that g(x)⊕x = g(x′)⊕x′ for any x = x′. This is the 5rst example such that
a non-cryptographic primitive is substituted to construct the minimum round super-pseudorandom
permutation. Further we show e9cient constructions of super-pseudorandom permutations by
using above mentioned g.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Super-pseudorandomness
A secure block cipher should be indistinguishable from a truly random permutation.
Consider an in5nitely powerful distinguisher D which tries to distinguish a block cipher
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from a truly random permutation. It outputs 0 or 1 after making at most m queries
to the given encryption and=or decryption oracles. We say that a distinguisher D is
a pseudorandom distinguisher if it has oracle access to the encryption oracle. We
also say that a distinguisher D is a super-pseudorandom distinguisher if it has oracle
access to both the encryption oracle and the decryption oracle. Then a block cipher
E is called pseudorandom if any pseudorandom distinguisher D cannot distinguish E
from a truly random permutation. A block cipher E is called super-pseudorandom if
any super-pseudorandom distinguisher D cannot distinguish E from a truly random
permutation.
1.2. Previous works
The super-pseudorandomness of Feistel permutation (like DES) has been studied
extensively so far. Let (f1; f2; f3) denote the three round Feistel permutation such
that the ith round function is fi. Similarly, let (f1; f2; f3; f4) denote the four round
Feistel permutation.
Suppose that each fi is a random function. Then Luby and RackoE proved that
(f1; f2; f3) is pseudorandom and (f1; f2; f3; f4) is super-pseudorandom [4]. Lucks
showed that the (h1; f2; f3) is pseudorandom even if h1 is an -XOR universal hash
function [5]. Suppose that h1 and h4 are uniform -XOR universal hash functions.
Then Naor and Reingold proved that h4 ◦(f2; f3)◦h1 is super-pseudorandom [8], and
Ramzan and Reyzin showed that (h1; f2; f3; h4) is super-pseudorandom even if the
distinguisher has oracle access to f2 and f3 [9].
On the other hand, let  (p1; p2; p3; p4; p5) denote the 5ve round MISTY type per-
mutation such that the ith round permutation is pi. Suppose that each pi is a random
permutation. Then Iwata et al. [3] and Gilbert and Minier [2] independently showed
that  (p1; p2; p3; p4; p5) is super-pseudorandom. More than that, let hi be a uniform
-XOR universal permutation. Iwata et al. proved that
1.  (h1; h2; p3; p4; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has oracle
access to p3, p−13 , p4 and p
−1
4 .
2.  (h1; p2; p3; p4; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has oracle
access to p2, p−12 , p3, p
−1
3 , p4 and p
−1
4 .
1.3. Our contribution
Four round Feistel permutation (like DES) is super-pseudorandom if each round
function is random or a secret universal hash function. A similar result is known for
5ve round MISTY type permutation. It seems that each round function must be at least
either random or secret in both cases.
In this paper, however, we show that the second round permutation g in 5ve round
MISTY type permutation need not be cryptographic at all, i.e., no randomness nor
secrecy is required. g has only to satisfy that g(x) ⊕ x = g(x′) ⊕ x′ for any x = x′.
This is the 5rst example such that a non-cryptographic primitive is substituted to con-
struct the minimum round super-pseudorandom permutation. Further we show e9cient
constructions of super-pseudorandom permutations by using above mentioned g.
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One might wonder if 5ve rounds can be reduced to four rounds to obtain super-
pseudorandomness of MISTY. However, it is not true because Sakurai and Zheng
showed that the four round MISTY type permutation  (p1; p2; p3; p4) is not super-
pseudorandom [10].
More precisely, we prove that 5ve round MISTY is super-pseudorandom if it is
 (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ), where g is the above mentioned permutation, h1 is an -XOR
universal permutation, h5 is a uniform -XOR universal permutation, and p is a ran-
dom permutation. Further, suppose that both h1 and h5 are uniform -XOR universal
permutations. Then we prove that it is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher
has oracle access to p and p−1.
More than that, we study the case such that the third and the fourth round per-
mutations are both p. In this case, we show that it is not super-pseudorandom nor
pseudorandom if a distinguisher has oracle access to p. More formally, we show that
for any 5xed and public g,  (p1; g; p; p; p5) is not pseudorandom if a distinguisher
has oracle access to p.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
For a bit string x∈{0; 1}2n, we denote the 5rst (left) n bits of x by xL and the last
(right) n bits of x by xR. If S is a probability space, then s
R← S denotes the process
of picking an element from S according to the underlying probability distribution. The
underlying distribution is assumed to be uniform (unless otherwise speci5ed).
Denote by Fn the set of all functions from {0; 1}n to {0; 1}n, which consists of 2n·2n
functions in total. Similarly, denote by Pn the set of all permutations from {0; 1}n to
{0; 1}n, which consists of (2n)! permutations in total.
2.2. MISTY type permutation [6,7]
Denition 2.1 (The basic MISTY type permutation). Let x∈{0; 1}2n. For any permu-
tation p∈Pn, de5ne the basic MISTY type permutation  p ∈P2n as  p(x) def= (xR; p(xL)⊕
xR). Note that it is a permutation since  −1p (x)= (p
−1(xL ⊕ xR); xL).
Denition 2.2 (The r round MISTY type permutation,  ). Let r¿1 be an integer, p1;
: : : ; pr ∈Pn be permutations. De5ne the r round MISTY type permutation  (p1; : : : ; pr)
∈P2n as  (p1; : : : ; pr) def=  ◦  pr ◦ · · · ◦  p1 , where (xL; xR)= (xR; xL) for x∈{0; 1}2n.
See Fig. 1 (the 5ve round MISTY type permutation) for an illustration. Note that
pi in Fig. 1 is a permutation. For simplicity, the left and right swaps are omitted.
2.3. Uniform -XOR universal permutation
Our de5nitions follow from those given in [1,3,9,11].
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Fig. 1. MISTY type permutation.
Denition 2.3. Let Hn be a permutation family over {0; 1}n. Denote by #Hn the size
of Hn.
1. Hn is a uniform permutation family if for any element x∈{0; 1}n and any element
y∈{0; 1}n, there exist exactly #Hn=2n permutations h∈Hn such that h(x)=y.
2. Hn is an -XOR universal permutation family if for any two distinct elements
x; x′ ∈{0; 1}n and any element y∈{0; 1}n, there exist at most #Hn permutations
h∈Hn such that h(x)⊕ h(x′)=y.
Let fa(x)
def= a · x over GF(2n), where a =0. Then {fa(x)} is a 1=(2n−1)-XOR uni-
versal permutation family.
Let fa;b(x)
def= a·x+b over GF(2n), where a =0. Then {fa;b(x)} is a uniform 1=(2n−1)-
XOR universal permutation family.
We will use the phrase “h is an -XOR universal permutation” to mean that “h is
drawn uniformly from an -XOR universal permutation family”. Similarly, we will use
the phrase “h is a uniform -XOR universal permutation”.
3. Improved super-pseudorandomness of MISTY type permutation
We say that a permutation g over {0; 1}n is XOR-distinct if
g(x)⊕ x = g(x′)⊕ x′
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for any x = x′. Let g(x)= a · x over GF(2n), where a =0; 1. Then this g is clearly
XOR-distinct.
In this section, we prove that  (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom even if the
second round permutation g is 5xed and publicly known. g has only to be XOR-distinct.
This means that the 5ve round MISTY type permutation is super-pseudorandom even
if the second round permutation has no randomness nor secrecy.
Let H 0n be an -XOR universal permutation family over {0; 1}n, and H 1n be a uniform
-XOR universal permutation family over {0; 1}n. De5ne
MISTY012n
def= { (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ) |p ∈ Pn; h1 ∈ H 0n ; h5 ∈ H 1n };
MISTY112n
def={ (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ) |p ∈ Pn; h1; h5 ∈ H 1n }:
3.1. Super-pseudorandomness of MISTY012n
Let D be a super-pseudorandom distinguisher for MISTY012n which makes at most
m queries in total. We consider two experiments, experiment 0 and experiment 1. In
experiment 0, D has oracle access to  and  −1, where  is randomly chosen from
MISTY012n. In experiment 1, D has oracle access to R and R
−1, where R is randomly
chosen from P2n.
De5ne the advantage of D as follows.
Adv(D) def= |p − pR|;
where
p 
def= Pr(D ; 
−1
(12n) = 1 |  R←MISTY012n);
pR
def= Pr(DR;R
−1
(12n) = 1 |R R←P2n):
Lemma 3.1. Fix x(i) ∈{0; 1}2n and y(i) ∈{0; 1}2n for 16i6m arbitrarily in such a
way that {x(i)}16i6m are all distinct and {y(i)}16i6m are all distinct.
Then the number of  ∈MISTY012n such that
 (x(i)) = y(i) for 16 ∀i 6 m (1)
is at least
(#H 0n )(#H
1
n )(2
n − 2m)!
(
1− 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
)
:
A proof is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.1. For any super-pseudorandom distinguisher D that makes at most m
queries in total,
Adv(D)6 2 · m(m− 1) + 2m
2
2n
:
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Proof. Let O=R or  . The super-pseudorandom distinguisher D has oracle access to
O and O−1.
There are two types of queries D can make: either (+; x) which denotes the query
“what is O(x)?”, or (−; y) which denotes the query “what is O−1(y)?” For the ith query
D makes to O or O−1, de5ne the query-answer pair (x(i); y(i))∈{0; 1}2n×{0; 1}2n,
where either D’s query was (+; x(i)) and the answer it got was y(i) or D’s query
was (−; y(i)) and the answer it got was x(i). De5ne view v of D as v=((x(1); y(1)); : : : ;
(x(m); y(m))).
Without loss of generality, we assume that {x(i)}16i6m are all distinct, and
{y(i)}16i6m are all distinct.
Since D has unbounded computational power, D can be assumed to be deterministic.
Therefore, the 5nal output of D (0 or 1) depends only on v. Hence denote by CD(v)
the 5nal output of D.
Let Cone
def= {v |CD(v)= 1} and None def= #Cone.
Evaluation of pR: From the de5nition of pR, we have
pR = Pr
R
(DR;R
−1
(12n) = 1)
=
#{R |DR;R−1 (12n) = 1}
(22n)!
:
For each v∈ Cone, the number of R such that
R(x(i)) = y(i) for 16 ∀i 6 m (2)
is exactly (22n − m)!. Therefore, we have
pR =
∑
v∈Cone
#{R |R satisfying (2)}
(22n)!
=None · (2
2n − m)!
(22n)!
:
Evaluation of p : From the de5nition of p , we have
p = Pr
h1 ;p;h5
(D ; 
−1
(12n) = 1)
=
#{(h1; p; h5) |D ; −1 (12n) = 1}
(#H 0n )(2n)!(#H 1n )
:
Similarly to pR, we have
p =
∑
v∈Cone
#{(h1; p; h5) | (h1; p; h5) satisfying (1)}
(#H 0n )(2n)!(#H 1n )
:
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Then from Lemma 3.1, we obtain that
p ¿
∑
v∈Cone
(2n − 2m)!(1− 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m22n )
(2n)!
= None
(2n − 2m)!
(2n)!
(
1− 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
)
= pR
(22n)!(2n − 2m)!
(22n − m)!(2n)!
(
1− 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
)
:
Since (22n)!(2n − 2m)!=(22n − m)!(2n)!¿1 (This can be shown easily by an induction
on m), we have
p ¿pR
(
1− 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
)
¿pR − 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
: (3)
Applying the same argument to 1− p and 1− pR yields that
1− p ¿ 1− pR − 2 · m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
: (4)
Finally, (3) and (4) give |p − pR|62 · m(m− 1) + 2m2=2n.
3.2. Super-pseudorandomness of MISTY112n
Let D be a super-pseudorandom distinguisher for MISTY112n. D also has oracle ac-
cess to p and p−1, where p and p−1 are the third and fourth round permutations of
MISTY112n respectively. D makes at most m queries in total. We consider two exper-
iments, experiment 0 and experiment 1. In experiment 0, D has oracle access to not
only  and  −1, but also p and p−1, where  is randomly chosen from MISTY112n. In
experiment 1, D has oracle access to R, R−1, p and p−1, where R is randomly chosen
from P2n and p is randomly chosen from Pn.
De5ne the advantage of D as follows.
Adv(D) def= |p − pR|
where
p 
def= Pr(D ; 
−1 ;p;p−1 (12n) = 1 |  R←MISTY112n);
pR
def= Pr(DR;R
−1 ;p;p−1 (12n) = 1 |R R←P2n; p R←Pn):
Lemma 3.2. Let m0 and m1 be integers. Fix x(i) ∈{0; 1}2n and y(i) ∈{0; 1}2n for
16i6m0 arbitrarily in such a way that {x(i)}16i6m0 are all distinct and {y(i)}16i6m0
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are all distinct. Similarly, @x X (i) ∈{0; 1}n and Y (i) ∈{0; 1}n for 16i6m1 arbitrarily
in such a way that {X (i)}16i6m1 are all distinct and {Y (i)}16i6m1 are all distinct.
Then the number of  ∈MISTY112n such that
 (x(i)) = y(i) for 16 ∀i 6 m0 and p(X (i)) = Y (i) for 16 ∀i 6 m1 (5)
is at least
(#H 1n )
2(2n − 2m0 − m1)!
(
1− 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n −
2m20
2n
)
:
A proof is given in Appendix B.
Theorem 3.2. Let D be a super-pseudorandom distinguisher that also has oracle
access to p and p−1. Suppose that D makes at most m0 queries to  and  −1,
or R and R−1 in total, and at most m1 queries to p and p−1 in total. Then
Adv(D)6 2 · m(m− 1) + 6m
2
2n
;
where m=m0 + m1.
Proof. Let O=R or  . The super-pseudorandom distinguisher D has oracle access to
O, O−1, p and p−1.
There are four types of queries D can make: either (+; x) which denotes the query
“what is O(x)?”, (−; y) which denotes the query “what is O−1(y)?”, (+; X ) which
denotes the query “what is p(X )?”, or (−; Y ) which denotes the query “what is
p−1(Y )?” For the ith query D makes to O or O−1, de5ne the query-answer pair
(x(i); y(i))∈{0; 1}2n×{0; 1}2n, where either D’s query was (+; x(i)) and the answer it
got was y(i) or D’s query was (−; y(i)) and the answer it got was x(i). Similarly for the
ith query D makes to p or p−1, de5ne the query-answer pair (X (i); Y (i))∈{0; 1}n×
{0; 1}n, where either D’s query was (+; X (i)) and the answer it got was Y (i) or D’s
query was (−; Y (i)) and the answer it got was X (i). De5ne view v and V of D as
v=((x(1); y(1)); : : : ; (x(m0); y(m0))) and V =((X (1); Y (1)); : : : ; (X (m1); Y (m1))). Without loss
of generality, we assume that {x(i)}16i6m0 are all distinct, {y(i)}16i6m0 are all distinct,
{X (i)}16i6m1 are all distinct and {Y (i)}16i6m1 are all distinct.
Then similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1, denote by CD(v; V ) the 5nal output
of D.
Let (C;V)one
def= {(v; V ) |CD(v; V )= 1} and None def= #(C;V)one.
Evaluation of pR: From the de5nition of pR, we have
pR = Pr
R;p
(DR;R
−1 ;p;p−1 (12n) = 1)
=
#{(R; p) |DR;R−1 ;p;p−1 (12n) = 1}
(22n)!(2n)!
:
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For each (v; V )∈ (C;V)one, the number of (R; p) such that
R(x(i)) = y(i) for 16 ∀i 6 m0 and p(X (i)) = Y (i) for 16 ∀i 6 m1 (6)
is exactly (22n − m0)!(2n − m1)!. Therefore, we have
pR =
∑
(v;V )∈(C;V)one
#{(R; p) | (R; p) satisfying (6)}
(22n)!(2n)!
=None · (2
2n − m0)!
(22n)!
· (2
n − m1)!
(22n)!
:
Evaluation of p : From the de5nition of p , we have
p = Pr
h1 ;p;h5
(D ; 
−1 ;p;p−1 (12n) = 1)
=
#{(h1; p; h5) |D ; −1 ;p;p−1 (12n) = 1}
(#H 1n )2(2n)!
:
Similarly to pR, we have
p =
∑
(v;V )∈(C;V)one
#{(h1; p; h5) | (h1; p; h5) satisfying (5)}
(#H 1n )2(2n)!
:
Then from Lemma 3.2, we obtain that
p ¿
∑
(v;V )∈(C;V)one
(2n − 2m0 − m1)!(1− 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n − 2m
2
0
2n )
(2n)!
= None
(2n − 2m0 − m1)!
(2n)!
(
1− 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n −
2m20
2n
)
= pR
(22n)!(2n − 2m0 − m1)!
(22n − m0)!(2n − m1)!
(
1− 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n −
2m20
2n
)
:
Since (22n)!(2n − 2m0 − m1)!=(22n − m0)!(2n − m1)!¿1 (This can be shown easily by
an induction on m0), we have
p ¿pR
(
1− 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n −
2m20
2n
)
¿pR − 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n −
2m20
2n
¿pR − 2 · m(m− 1)− 6m
2
2n
: (7)
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Applying the same argument to 1− p and 1− pR yields that
1− p ¿ 1− pR − 2 · m(m− 1)− 6m
2
2n
: (8)
Finally, (7) and (8) give |p − pR|62 · m(m− 1) + 6m2=2n.
4. Negative result
Let g be a 5xed and publicly known XOR-distinct permutation. In Theorem 3.2, we
showed that  (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom even if the distinguisher has
oracle access to p and p−1, where h1 and h5 are uniform -XOR universal permuta-
tions, and p is a random permutation.
One might think that  (h1; g; p; p; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom even if the distin-
guisher has oracle access to p and p−1. In this section, however, we show that this
is not true. We can distinguish  (h1; g; p; p; h−15 ) from a random permutation with
advantage very close to 1.
More generally, let p1; p2; p; p5 ∈Pn be random permutations and  =  (p1; p2; p; p;
p5). We prove that  is not pseudorandom if the distinguisher has oracle access to
p2, p−12 and p. This proof implies that for any 5xed and public g,  (p1; g; p; p; p5)
is not super-pseudorandom nor pseudorandom if the distinguisher has oracle access
to p.
De5ne the advantage of D as follows.
Adv(D) def= |p − pR|
where
p 
def= Pr(D ;p2 ;p
−1
2 ;p(12n) = 1 |p1; p2; p; p5 R←Pn;  =  (p1; p2; p; p; p5));
pR
def= Pr(DR;p2 ;p
−1
2 ;p(12n) = 1 |R R←P2n; p2; p R←Pn):
Theorem 4.1. There exists a pseudorandom distinguisher D that has oracle access to
p2, p−12 and p and makes 6 queries in total,
Adv(D)¿ 1− 2
2n
:
Proof. Let O=R or  . Our distinguisher D has oracle access to O, p2; p−12 and p.
Consider the following D:
1. Ask (0; : : : ; 0)∈{0; 1}n to p−12 and obtain A.
2. Pick X; A′ ∈{0; 1}n such that A =A′ arbitrarily.
3. Ask (X; A) to O and obtain (Y; B).
4. Ask A⊕ A′ to p2 and obtain C.
5. Ask A′ ⊕ B to p and obtain D.
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6. Ask A′ ⊕ B⊕ C to p and obtain E.
7. Ask (X; A⊕ A′) to O and obtain (Z; F).
8. Output “1” if and only if F =A′ ⊕ B⊕ C ⊕ D ⊕ E.
If O=  , then B is the input to p in both third round and fourth round at step 3
since p2(A)= (0; : : : ; 0). Therefore we have p1(X )⊕A=B. Now the input to p in the
third round at step 7 is p1(X )⊕ A⊕ A′ which is equivalent to A′ ⊕ B. Next the input
to p in the fourth round at step 7 is A′⊕B⊕C since p2(A⊕A′)=C. Then we always
have F =A′ ⊕ B⊕ C ⊕ D ⊕ E at step 8. Hence we have p =1.
If O=R, we have pR = 2
n
22n−16
2
2n .
Corollary 4.1. For any @xed and public g,  (p1; g; p; p; p5) is not super-pseudo-
random if the distinguisher has oracle access to p.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed more e9cient constructions of super-pseudorandom per-
mutations based on the 5ve round MISTY type permutation than those given in [3].
In particular, we showed that the second round permutation g need not be crypto-
graphic at all, i.e., no randomness nor secrecy is required.
More precisely, let p and pi be random permutations, then we proved that
1.  (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom, where h1 is an -XOR universal per-
mutation, g is a (publicly known and 5xed) XOR-distinct permutation, and h5 is a
uniform -XOR universal permutation (Theorem 3.1),
2.  (h1; g; p; p−1; h−15 ) is super-pseudorandom, even if the adversary has oracle access
to p and p−1, where h1 and h5 are uniform -XOR universal permutations, and g
is a (publicly known and 5xed) XOR-distinct permutation (Theorem 3.2),
3. but  (p1; p2; p; p; p5) is not pseudorandom nor super-pseudorandom, if the adver-
sary has oracle access to p2, p−12 and p (Theorem 4.1).
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3.1
In  , we denote by I (i)3 ∈{0; 1}n the input to p in the third round, and denote by
O(i)3 ∈{0; 1}n the output of it. Similarly, I (i)4 ; O(i)4 ∈{0; 1}n are the input and output of p
in the fourth round, respectively. That is, p(I (i)3 )=O
(i)
3 and p(I
(i)
4 )=O
(i)
4 . See Fig. 2.
Number of h1: First, for any 5xed i and j such that 16i¡j6m:
• if x(i)L = x(j)L , then there exists no h1 such that
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ x(j)R (A.1)
since x(i)L = x
(j)
L implies x
(i)
R = x(j)R ;
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Fig. 2. Illustration for x(i)L , x
(i)
R , y
(i)
L , y
(i)
R , I
(i)
3 , O
(i)
3 , I
(i)
4 and O
(i)
4 .
• if x(i)L = x(j)L , then the number of h1 which satis5es (A.1) is at most #H 0n since h1
is an -XOR universal permutation.
Therefore, the number of h1 such that
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ x(j)R for 16 ∃i ¡ ∃j 6 m (A.2)
is at most (m2 )#H
0
n .
Next, for any 5xed i and j such that 16i¡j6m:
• if x(i)L = x(j)L , then there exists no h1 such that
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ g(x(i)R )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ g(x(j)R )⊕ x(j)R (A.3)
since x(i)L = x
(j)
L implies x
(i)
R = x(j)R , and our XOR-distinct g guarantees g(x(i)R )⊕ x(i)R =
g(x(j)R )⊕ x(j)R ;
• if x(i)L = x(j)L , then the number of h1 which satis5es (A.3) is at most #H 0n since h1
is an -XOR universal permutation.
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Therefore, the number of h1 such that
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ g(x(i)R )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ g(x(j)R )⊕ x(j)R for 16 ∃i ¡ ∃j 6 m (A.4)
is at most (m2 )#H
0
n .
Then, from (A.2) and (A.4), the number of h1 such that
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ x(j)R for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m; and
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ g(x(i)R )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ g(x(j)R )⊕ x(j)R for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m (A.5)
is at least #H 0n − 2(m2 )#H 0n . Fix h1 which satis5es (A.5) arbitrarily. This implies that
I (1)3 ; : : : ; I
(m)
3 and O
(1)
4 ; : : : ; O
(m)
4 are 5xed in such a way that:
• I (i)3 = I (j)3 for 16∀i¡∀j6m, and
• O(i)4 =O(j)4 for 16∀i¡∀j6m.
Number of h5. Similarly, the number of h5 such that
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ y(i)R = h5(y(j)L ⊕ y(j)R )⊕ y(j)R for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m;
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ O(i)4 = h5(y(j)L ⊕ y(j)R )⊕ O(j)4 for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m;
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ O(i)4 = O(j)4 for 16 ∀i; ∀j 6 m; and
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ y(i)R = I (j)3 for 16 ∀i; ∀j 6 m; (A.6)
is at least #H 1n − 2(m2 )#H 1n − (2m2#H 1n )=2n. Fix h5 which satis5es (A.6) arbitrarily.
This implies that O(1)3 ; : : : ; O
(m)
3 and I
(1)
4 ; : : : ; I
(m)
4 are 5xed in such a way that:
• I (i)4 = I (j)4 for 16∀i¡∀j6m,
• O(i)3 =O(j)3 for 16∀i¡∀j6m,
• O(i)3 =O(j)4 for 16∀i;∀j6m, and
• I (i)4 = I (j)3 for 16∀i;∀j6m.
Number of p. Now h1 and h5 are 5xed in such a way that
I (1)3 ; : : : ; I
(m)
3 ; I
(1)
4 ; : : : ; I
(m)
4
(which are inputs to p) are all distinct and
O(1)3 ; : : : ; O
(m)
3 ; O
(1)
4 ; : : : ; O
(m)
4
(which are corresponding outputs of p) are all distinct. In other words, for p, the
above 2m input–output pairs are determined. The other 2n − 2m input–output pairs are
undetermined. Therefore we have (2n − 2m)! possible choice of p for any such 5xed
h1 and h5.
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To summarize, we have:
• at least #H 0n − 2(m2 )#H 0n choice of h1,
• at least #H 1n − 2(m2 )#H 1n − 2m
2#H 1n
2n choice of h5 when h1 is 5xed, and• (2n − 2m)! choice of p when h1 and h5 are 5xed.
Then the number of  ∈MISTY012n which satisfy (1) is at least
(#H 0n )(#H
1
n )(2
n − 2m)!
(
1− 2
(
m
2
))(
1− 2
(
m
2
)
− 2m
2
2n
)
¿ (#H 0n )(#H
1
n )(2
n − 2m)!
(
1− 2m(m− 1)− 2m
2
2n
)
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 3.2
We use the same de5nition of I (i)3 , O
(i)
3 , I
(i)
4 and O
(i)
4 as in the proof of Lemma 3.1.
See Fig. 2.
Number of h1. First, similarly to the proof of Lemma 3.1, the number of h1 such that
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ x(j)R for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m0;
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ x(i)R = X (j) for 16 ∀i 6 m0 and 16 ∀j 6 m1;
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ g(x(i)R )⊕ x(i)R = h1(x(j)L )⊕ g(x(j)R )⊕ x(j)R for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m0;
h1(x
(i)
L )⊕ g(x(i)R )⊕ x(i)R = Y (j) for 16 ∀i 6 m0 and 16 ∀j 6 m1 (A.7)
is at least #H 1n −2(m02 )#H 1n − (2m0m1#H 1n )=2n. Fix h1 which satis5es (A.7) arbitrarily.
This implies that I (1)3 ; : : : ; I
(m0)
3 and O
(1)
4 ; : : : ; O
(m0)
4 are 5xed in such a way that:
• I (i)3 = I (j)3 for 16∀i¡∀j6m0,
• I (i)3 =X (j) for 16∀i6m0 and 16∀j6m1,
• O(i)4 =O(j)4 for 16∀i¡∀j6m0, and
• O(i)4 =Y (j) for 16∀i6m0 and 16∀j6m1.
Number of h5. Similarly, the number of h5 such that
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ y(i)R = h5(y(j)L ⊕ y(j)R )⊕ y(j)R for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m0;
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ y(i)R = X (j) for 16 ∀i 6 m0 and 16 ∀j 6 m0;
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ O(i)4 = h5(y(j)L ⊕ y(j)R )⊕ O(j)4 for 16 ∀i ¡ ∀j 6 m0;
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h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ O(i)4 = Y (j) for 16 ∀i 6 m0 and 16 ∀j 6 m0;
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ O(i)4 = O(j)4 for 16 ∀i; ∀j 6 m0; and
h5(y
(i)
L ⊕ y(i)R )⊕ y(i)R = I (j)3 for 16 ∀i; ∀j 6 m0; (A.8)
is at least #H 1n − 2(m02 )#H 1n − (2m0m1#H 1n )=2n − (2m20#H 1n )=2n. Fix h5 which satis5es
(A.8) arbitrarily. This implies that O(1)3 ; : : : ; O
(m0)
3 and I
(1)
4 ; : : : ; I
(m0)
4 are 5xed in such a
way that:
• I (i)4 = I (j)4 for 16∀i¡∀j6m0,
• I (i)4 =X (j) for 16∀i6m0 and 16∀j6m1,
• O(i)3 =O(j)3 for 16∀i¡∀j6m0,
• O(i)3 =Y (j) for 16∀i6m0 and 16∀j6m1,
• O(i)3 =O(j)4 for 16∀i;∀j6m0, and
• I (i)4 = I (j)3 for 16∀i;∀j6m0.
Number of p. Now h1 and h5 are 5xed in such a way that
I (1)3 ; : : : ; I
(m0)
3 ; I
(1)
4 ; : : : ; I
(m0)
4 ; X
(1); : : : ; X (m1)
(which are inputs to p) are all distinct and
O(1)3 ; : : : ; O
(m0)
3 ; O
(1)
4 ; : : : ; O
(m0)
4 ; Y
(1); : : : ; Y (m1)
(which are corresponding outputs of p) are all distinct. Then we have (2n−2m0−m1)!
possible choice of p for any such 5xed h1 and h5.
To summarize, we have:
• at least #H 1n − 2(m02 )#H 1n − 2m0m1#H
1
n
2n choice of h1,
• at least #H 1n − 2(m02 )#H 1n − 2m0m1#H
1
n
2n − 2m
2
0#H
1
n
2n choice of h5 when h1 is 5xed, and• (2n − 2m0 − m1)! choice of p when h1 and h5 are 5xed.
Then the number of  ∈MISTY112n which satisfy (5) is at least
(#H 1n )
2(2n − 2m0 − m1)!
×
(
1− 2
(
m0
2
)
− 2m0m1
2n
)(
1− 2
(
m0
2
)
− 2m0m1
2n
− 2m
2
0
2n
)
¿ (#H 1n )
2(2n − 2m0 − m1)!
(
1− 2 · m0(m0 − 1)− 4m0m12n −
2m20
2n
)
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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